Law Without Leverage? The Middle East’s New Security Geometry and Europe’s Moment of Choice
On February 23, 2026, a joint ministerial declaration-signed by representatives from Saudi Arabia, Brazil, France, several Nordic and Southern European states (including Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Slovenia), Egypt, Jordan, Türkiye, Qatar, Indonesia, Luxembourg, and others, together with the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation-issued a forceful condemnation of recent Israeli measures in the West Bank.[1] The declaration explicitly cited violations of international humanitarian law, referenced longstanding UN Security Council resolutions, invoked the 2024 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences arising from the Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and warned that accelerated settlement expansion, land reclassification as “Israeli state land,” and administrative entrenchment constituted de facto annexation and a direct assault on the viability of a future Palestinian state.
The rules-based international order continues to generate normative language and diplomatic coordination, yet the geopolitical landscape is rapidly shifting toward arrangements grounded in leverage and hard security. States are increasingly looking not to alignment or confrontation, but to hedging as a way of coping with uncertainty and rebalancing power.
The Rise of Strategic Hedging
One of the trends that define the present and future of defense relations between nations is the strengthening of defense convergence. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to start his two-day visit to Israel on February 25, nine years after his first visit to the nation. The exchanges between Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, and Modi, the Prime Minister of India, have elevated their relations from traditional arms acquisition to missile defense, drone warfare, AI-based systems, and even joint production and integration of directed energy-based air defense systems.[2]
This reflects genuine strategic interoperability. Netanyahu has publicly advanced the concept of a “hexagon of alliances,” [3] an adaptable, mission-specific framework linking Israel, India, Greece, and Cyprus, with invitations extended to select Arab, African, and Asian partners – “unite to collectively stand against what he called “radical” adversaries.”[4]
The system is intended to offset the influence of destabilizing regional actors via dynamic, technology-based coalitions rather than fixed blocs.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) on September 17, 2025.[5] The pact emphasizes mutual defense commitments, joint military exercises, intelligence coordination, and layered deterrence concepts-elements frequently likened to NATO-style obligations, though tailored to Gulf–South Asian priorities.
Although it does not
replace or supplant current U.S. security guarantees, the SMDA is a strategic
form of insurance against volatility and unpredictability in American policy. These
developments represent a larger trend: that alliances are becoming more
flexible, capability-driven, and supplementary to traditional great-power
guarantees.
The Hollow Centre of
Enforcement
The February 2026
announcement represents a high degree of multilateral cooperation, but the fact
that it was made at all represents a problem of enforcement in the
international system. The international system is still capable of producing
legal and normative statements, but it is increasingly unable to convert these
into effective constraints on state behavior.
The UN Security Council
is still the locus of collective legitimacy, but the problem of geopolitical
fragmentation-veto politics, divergent priorities, and differing threat
perceptions-has weakened its ability to impose a collective outcome in
high-stakes crises.
States act rationally,
as they do everywhere: if the law cannot guarantee security, they turn to
power-based arrangements. This is reflected in current U.S. military analysis.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine has warned publicly that a
military strike against Iran would pose “severe risks,” including “prolonged
conflict, high casualties, depletion of munitions, and strategic entanglement.”
[6]
Although he has not ruled out a strike, his statements,
together with the guarded language of Vice President Vance and the equivocal
stance of Secretary of State Rubio, indicate a certain degree of internal
discomfort. President Trump later
saying Caine “would like not to see War but, if a decision is made on going
against Iran at a Military level, it is his opinion that it will be something
easily won”. White House spokeswoman Kelly says Trump listens to a “host of opinions
on any given issue and decides based on what is best for US national security”.[7]
In the meantime, the
sense of urgency in the February statement underscores the growing disparity
between condemnation and action. Multilateralism is not moribund but watered
down. Normative architectures now coexist-and, at times, compete-with bilateral
deterrence compacts, tech partnerships, and executive-led diplomatic
arrangements.
U.S. Diplomacy: Agility
Over Institutions
Under President Trump, the U.S. has emphasized agile, results-oriented formats. The Board of Peace, created through executive order and mentioned in UNSCR 2803 (2025), is headed by the President and features core regional partners (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,Türkiye, Qatar, UAE, and others).[8] It concentrates on Gaza administration, reconstruction, and the application of a comprehensive peace plan, securing commitments of over $7 billion (together with U.S. contributions) through expedited, discretionary negotiation rather than UN consensus-building.[9]
European allies have been circumspect, reluctant to support projects that seem
to circumvent long-standing UN mandates.
As Washington simultaneously weighs military options against Iran-including potential preemptive strikes-the IAEA Director General’s renewed proposal to cap Iran’s uranium enrichment at low levels for civilian medical use underscores the
narrow window for diplomacy amid escalation risks.[10]
Europe’s Balancing Act
The European Union remains normatively anchored in the two-state solution and UN-centered legitimacy; several Member States participated in the February 23 declaration. Yet EU foreign policy operates on consensus, and the European External Action Service coordinates rather than commands, limiting its ability to overcome
internal divisions. Despite periodic rhetoric about “strategic autonomy,” no
independent European deterrence architecture has emerged capable of replacing
American guarantees. Existing bilateral treaties permit U.S. forces to utilize
European facilities for operations, including potential strikes, with minimal
or no prior notification, further complicating Europe’s position. The result is
deliberate diplomatic hedging: participate to avoid marginalization, influence
where possible, preserve normative coherence, but stop short of full alignment
with U.S.-led executive mechanisms that diverge from UN frameworks.
The Strategic Question
The contemporary Middle
East reveals a transitional security order in which legal condemnation coexists
with defense integration, multilateral declarations coexist with modular
coalitions, and institutional legitimacy competes with transactional, executive
diplomacy. The deeper issue is whether Europe’s preferred model-institutional
engagement without autonomous hard-power leverage-can retain meaningful
influence in a system increasingly organized around layered deterrence,
technological interoperability, and bilateral hedging. Regional actors are not
awaiting the revival or strengthening of centralized enforcement mechanisms;
they are proactively constructing parallel alternatives. If the center of
gravity in international security governance continues shifting from law to
capability-based arrangements, Europe’s influence will depend less on the
volume of its normative voice and more on its structural adaptability.
The February 23, 2026 declaration demonstrates that the rules-based order can still speak with a collective voice. In an era of modular alliances and agile diplomacy,
however, voice alone may prove insufficient. Europe faces not merely a
rhetorical choice, but an architectural one.
Photo: The Menaced Assassin (also known as The Murderer Threatened)
René Magritte - https://www.moma.org/collection/works/79267
Magritte’s picture is famous for its portrayal of an environment full of unresolved tensions and mysteries: a murder has been committed, yet the apparent murderer does not escape or react with urgency; he listens to a gramophone record.
Individuals in the foreground are ready to take action (with a club, with a net) to apprehend the apparent murderer, yet nothing occurs.
[1] Joint Ministerial Declaration on
Israeli Measures in the West Bank, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, February 23, 2026.
[2]Surendra Singh, article in Times of
India - https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/defence/news/india-plans-to-buy-israels-advanced-drones-missiles-laser-defence-systems-pms-israel-visit-likely-to-see-mou-on-def-cooperation-being-inked/articleshow/128690624.cms
In fact, India is currently engaged in
acquisition and partnership discussions for Israel’s state-of-the-art
technologies such as its combat drones, long-range missiles like the ‘Rampage’
and ‘Air LORA,’ and its directed-energy-based technologies like the ‘Iron Beam’.
It’s also related to India’s own programs like the ‘Sudarshan Chakra’
initiative for developing multi-layered air defense systems through the
integration of technologies like the ‘Barak-8’ along with AI, sensors, and
cyber capabilities. The importance of AI
technologies related to security/missiles/drones, missile defense systems, and
moving towards joint production has been emphasized by Netanyahu along with
other officials such as Israel’s ambassador to India, Reuven Azar. The arms
deal valued at billions of dollars (such as the deal of ~$8.6 billion expected
to be signed in 2026) highlights the change in India-Israel ties with Israel
being at the forefront of supplying India with state-of-the-art technologies
[3] “What’s Netanyahu’s planned
‘hexagon’ alliance – and can it work?” available at:
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/23/whats-netanyahus-planned-hexagon-alliance-and-can-it-work
[4] “What’s Netanyahu’s planned
‘hexagon’ alliance – and can it work?” available at:
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/23/whats-netanyahus-planned-hexagon-alliance-and-can-it-work
[5] Naade
Ali, Marvin G. Weinbaum, “Pakistan’s
strategic defense pact with Saudi Arabia: A new security architecture in the
wider Middle East” October 8, 2025
https://mei.edu/publication/pakistans-strategic-defense-pact-saudi-arabia-new-security-architecture-wider-middle/
[6] Barak
Ravid, Marc Caputo, “Trump’s top general warns of
Iran strike risks” available at: https://www.axios.com/2026/02/23/iran-strike-trump-gen-dan-caine-vance-rubio
[7] Alexander
Ward, Lara Seligman, Shelby
Holliday, “Pentagon Flags
Risks of a Major Operation Against Iran” available at: https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-flags-risks-of-a-major-operation-against-iran-1c7e9939?mod=hp_lead_pos8
[8] United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2803 (2025) was adopted on 17 November 2025. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4093207?v=pdf&ln=en
It
supports the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict” (also known as a
Gaza peace plan, which is linked to U.S. leadership with President Trump). It
clearly welcomes the establishment of a Board of Peace for the purpose of
reconstructing the Gaza Strip. The resolution connects the Board of Peace with
transitional administration and governance structures in Gaza as part of the
implementation of the plan. It authorizes the Board (and Member States
participating in the Board) to establish operational bodies within the Board’s
transitional authority and oversight. It also authorizes the establishment of
an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza within the Board’s umbrella.
[9] “Trump gets pledges for Gaza
reconstruction and troop commitments at inaugural Board of Peace talks”
available at: https://apnews.com/article/trump-board-of-peace-first-meeting-22e587df67e27cd1e1d96e446cb88378
[10] Thomas Seibert , “This
proposal from Vienna is intended to avert a war with Iran.”
https://www.diepresse.com/20618550/dieser-vorschlag-aus-wien-soll-den-iran-krieg-abwenden
Good analysis